
Forensic artifacts in one case may not be exist in another. Read more Navigate Downīrett Shavers, in Placing the Suspect Behind the Keyboard, 2013 This case is different from that caseĮvery investigation is unique because people are unique. In the next section we will explore a concept that is not as well known as that of the IOC, yet still provides a tremendous amount of value to those seeking to understand more about their host and network environments while attempting to forecast and predict threat activity. Not to mention the fact that, at least in the eyes of certain organizations and industry subject matter experts, IOCs are merely attributes of IOAs. This is important due to the fact that there remains some degree of debate as to what an IOC is (exactly) within the information security industry, how they are used, and to what degree. If we are to assume that our definition of IOCs is true and accurate and that IOCs apply to machine-oriented platforms such as firewalls, IDSs, IPSs, ETDR platforms, and advanced threat detection (ATD) products among other platforms, as well as to information security and cyber threat intelligence analysts respectively, then we must dismiss lists such as these in relation to IOCs and relegate them to behaviors associated with IOAs and TTP.

Suspicious registry or system file changes Large number of requests for the same file In their list they include observable behaviors such as: However, the list provided by Dark Reading is actually better aligned with the definition we saw above for IOAs or TTPs.
